We document that, conditioned on a positive offer price revision from the midpoint of the initial filing range, one extra piece of media coverage during the filing period for an IPO is associated with about two percentage points greater underpricing. Media coverage during the filing period doubles the adjusted R 2 in price revision regressions, with media coverage positively correlated with the absolute value of price revisions. One extra piece of media coverage generally leads to an additional 2.8% increase in the offer price when the price revision is positive, or to a 1.9% greater decrease if the price revision is negative. Combined with our results on underpricing, it appears that underwriters fully adjust for media coverage when revising the offer price downwards but only partially adjust when the offer price is revised upwards. We find that the positive relationship between media coverage and underpricing is stronger when ex ante uncertainty is greater, and fail to find any relationship between positive media coverage and IPO firms' long run underperformance. Overall, our findings are consistent with theories of underpricing being driven by the need to compensate investors for information acquisition, but are not consistent with investor sentiment or prospect theory explanations. * We would like to thank
Introduction
Under the book building method for initial public offerings (IPOs), many key aspects of the process are unobservable. The underwriter markets the offering to a select group of investors through road shows and then collects non-binding indications of interest from those investors, before setting the final offer price. Book building models beginning with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) argue that the underwriter's control of both price and allocations may be used to induce investors to reveal their private information. This was extended by Sherman and Titman (2002) and Sherman (2000) , who showed that the process could also be used to induce investors to first produce costly private information. 1 These explanations focus on asymmetric information and the difficulties with establishing an appropriate value for new, highly speculative shares in an untried company.
The ideal way to test information acquisition models is to directly investigate the bookbuilding bids and allocation data. Unfortunately, the data are not publicly available. Outsiders are not able to observe the reports of investors 2 and in general cannot even observe how the final shares are allocated 3 . Thus it is difficult to test the full implications of various book building models.
In this study, we test information acquisition models using a new measure: media attention before the IPO day. Central to information acquisition models is the idea that, by going through the book building process, issuers are attempting to attract the attention of "the market". Issuers ultimately hope to convince investors to believe in and follow the stock, but it is not generally possible to purchase the approval of the market. What may be possible, however, is to purchase the market's attention, which is a necessary prerequisite for obtaining approval. Expected underpricing, as part of a well structured process, may induce investors to come to the road show, devote time to getting to know this particular company, and seriously consider the offering.
One indicator of whether the issuer will be able to attract the attention of the market is whether it can attract the attention of the media. Media attention, like analyst attention, is ultimately driven by the current and expected future attention of investors, customers and the market in general. Both analysts and the media want to cover companies for which there exists demand for such coverage (reporters want to write about companies that are 'newsworthy'). Of course, both analysts and the media use their judgment in forecasting what will attract such demand in the future. Moreover, both help to shape such demand through their choices, in part through economies of scale in information production, lowering the marginal cost of information acquisition for the general public 4 .
When an investment bank sets the offer price for a book building IPO, it cannot observe analyst attention (at least not in the US, due to restrictions on the initiation of analyst coverage). Nevertheless, the investment bank can observe two other indications of likely market attention: direct feedback from investors during the book building process, and the attention that the company has so far managed to attract from the media. Our measure of media attention is the number of articles mentioning the company from the day after the filing date to the day before the offering date. This measure, like feedback from investors during book building, is observable by the time the offer price is set but not when the initial filing range is chosen.
Both investor demand during the road show and the number of articles mentioning the company are the aggregations of the opinions of many individuals, each of whom is trying to forecast in part what demand will be for the offering, and for the shares on the aftermarket. Thus we would expect that the two will be highly correlated and will both help the underwriter to set the offer price. Investor feedback during the road show is unobservable, but media attention should be a good proxy, due to the strong expected correlation between the two.
In a book building model in which underpricing is driven by costly information acquisition, the total level of ex ante expected underpricing will be driven by the information costs (including opportunity costs) of investors, while the distribution of total expected underpricing across various hot and cold offerings will be determined by the need to satisfy the information reporting constraints, in order to induce accurate reporting of investor demand (as was first analyzed in Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) . As the amount of expected underpricing increases for whatever reason, the skewness of initial returns tends to increase, also. Sherman and Titman (2002) showed that when expected underpricing increases, it becomes optimal for the underwriter to concentrate more and more of the expected total return in hot offerings, where demand is high 5 .
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) , Busaba and Benveniste (1997) , Sherman (2000) , Sherman and Titman (2002) and Chen and Wilhelm (2005) have all analyzed the effects of the one price rule -the requirement that all IPO shares be sold at the same price. If shares are being underpriced to compensate informed investors, then the one price rule means that any uninformed investors who receive shares are also getting a positive expected return. Sherman and Titman (2002) show that this free riding by uninformed can be minimized if underpricing is disproportionately concentrated in offerings in which relatively few, if any, shares need to be allocated to the uninformed, due to high demand among the informed. This gives us testable implications for the interaction between media attention and factors that increase expected underpricing, such as uncertainty.
In addition to media attention, another good proxy for the investor demand reported through the book building process is price revision -the adjustment from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the offer price. This was first pointed out by Hanley (1993) , who noted that Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) model of book building predicts partial adjustment to private information: in order to satisfy the truth-telling constraints in Benveniste and Spindt's model, the offer price will only partially adjusts to any good information reported by investors, because underpricing of hot issues is needed to induce investors to report information that they know will lead to the offer price being increased. When good information is reported in such a model, the underwriter 'leaves something on the table' for the investors that reported that information, rather than raising the price by the full amount and thus leaving nothing for the investors, who then would have no reason to participate in the process. Although price revision is probably the best single proxy for the private information of investors, Sherman and Titman (2002) show that price revision is constrained in various ways, as we will discuss in Section 3, and thus there is room for a second proxy to more fully capture the feedback from investors.
To obtain the media coverage variable, we search the Factiva database by IPO company names from the filing date to the issue date. We then count the number of articles reported in the major business media resources prior to the offering dates. We show that when the price revision is positive, more media coverage relates to larger underpricing. The relation does not hold when the price revision is negative. The results are both statistically and economically significant. One extra line of media coverage leads to about two percentage points increase in underpricing.
Our findings are consistent with the information production theory. We further show that the positive relation between media coverage and underpricing is stronger when ex-ante uncertainty is greater, which is also consistent with the information production theory because information is more valuable when it is harder to estimate a firm's value.
One natural question is whether media coverage captures something else, such as public information or investor sentiment. Although market returns may affect an investor's opportunity cost of evaluating and hence may influence underpricing even in a book building model, all book building models going back to the original Benveniste and Spindt (1989) theory argue that the underwriter's goal is to induce the reporting (and perhaps first the production) of private information. Therefore, an implication of the model is that, although underpricing may have some relation to public information, it will be most closely tied to private, firm-specific information.
Thus, we use several alternative news indicators to test which news components of the media coverage drives the results. The market return prior to the IPO day represents only general public information, while the price revision reflects mainly firm-specific information. The industry return prior to the IPO or same industry firms' underpricing prior to the IPO would be somewhere in between general and firm-specific information.
We show that when we examine media coverage using general stock market movements as an indicator of good vs. bad private information, there is no asymmetric effect on underpricing associated with media coverage. On the other hand, there is asymmetry when we use industry return or industry firms' IPO underpricing as indicators. This asymmetry is even more pronounced when we use positive price revision to determine positive private information and becomes even larger when we have the best measure of private, firm-specific information, which is when the price revisions are in the opposite direction of the market movements. We interpret this monotonic pattern of the asymmetric effects as consistent with Sherman and Titman's (2002) model.
We also examine the relation between media attention and price revisions, finding that media coverage has significant power in explaining offer price revisions (from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the final offer price). Price revisions in either direction are more extreme when the company receives more media attention.
Combining these results with our earlier findings on initial returns, it appears that underwriters fully adjust for media attention when revising the offer price downwards but only partially adjust for media attention when revising the price upwards. Finally, we show that media coverage is not related to IPOs' long run underperformance, ruling out the investor sentiment explanation.
Past research beginning with Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) has examined the link between media attention and stock market prices. Bhattacharya, Galpin, Ray and Yu (2007) examine aftermarket trading prices for IPOs during the internet bubble, concluding that media coverage cannot explain the difference in risk-adjusted aftermarket returns for internet and non-internet IPOs during this period. Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness (CKV, 2006) were the first to examine media coverage before IPOs, linking that coverage with underpricing. They assume that media coverage is a proxy for the underwriter's marketing behavior, and examine whether media attention induces sentiment investors to buy a stock, thus driving up the initial aftermarket price.
CKV interpret the relations between media coverage and underpricing, and between media coverage and the average aftermarket trade size, as evidence in favor of investor sentiment models. In contrast, we test other models in addition to those based on investor sentiment. Our results on the relation between media coverage and measures of uncertainty and on alternative news indicators cannot be explained through the interpretation of media attention as a proxy for underwriter's marketing behavior, but are consistent with the interpretation of media coverage as a proxy for investor demand. Furthermore, we show that the evidence is not consistent with the investor sentiment explanations examined by CKV due to the lack of a relationship between long run returns and media attention.
In summary, using a new measure for investors' interest in IPOs, we provide supporting evidence for information production models of underpricing. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data set and all the variables used in the sample. Section 3 establishes the relation between the media coverage and underpricing. Section 4 investigates possible explanations for this relation and section 5 concludes.
The data

Sample
We begin with all the IPOs completed between First column of Table 1 reports the summary statistic for the whole sample. We have a total of 3,627 completed IPOs. The sample size is slightly smaller than in other studies because we restrict the sample to be in the intersection of the SDC, CRSP and Compustat databases. The average first day return is around 19%. 41% of the sample firms revise their offer prices upwards from the medium of the filing price range. The average price revision is 7.36% for an upward revision and -6.77% for a downward revision. On average, the IPO firms are 13 years old and there are 76 days from the filing day to the issue day. Technology firms and internet firms accounts for 38% of the sample and global offers account for 16%. 44% of the IPOs are backed by venture capitalists.
Construction of media coverage variable
We use Factiva to quantify the amount of media coverage. We restrict media sources to Dow Jones Newswire, Major News and Business Publications (U.S. and Canada), Press Release Wires (Business Wire, Business Wire Regulatory Disclosure, Canada Newswire and PR Newswire U.S.) and Reuters Newswires (Reuters News). We use the full company names as the search criteria but allow for common abbreviations such as "Co.", "Corp.", "Inc.", "Ltd." and "Grp.". For each IPO company, the search window is from one day after the filing date to one day before the offering date. We count the number of articles from these media sources covering the IPO company during the window. Since the length of the window varies across firm, we standardize the media coverage measure into a per month measure and use it in all of our empirical analyses. For a robustness check, we construct another media coverage measure using the one month window before the issue day.
We do not attempt to categorize coverage as "good" or "bad". Such a categorization is done in Bhattacharya, Galpin, Ray and Yu (2007) , which points out the potential errors from classifying articles mechanically through software. The human classification approach which they use would be too time-consuming for our sample size. Moreover, the classification of news content is not central to our point, whereas it crucial for their paper which specifically examined whether coverage of internet vs. non-internet stocks during the bubble was positive or negative, overall.
Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness (2006) attempt such a classification of "good" vs. "bad" coverage for a random subsample of 5,452 of their articles on IPOs, finding that "over 99% of these articles were non-negative, primarily descriptive stories". Although journalists exercise judgment in deciding which companies to cover, their role generally is to report information and not to editorialize. Thus, we feel that the primary information for our purposes is the mere fact that a reporter felt that the company was newsworthy, not whether the tone of the article was positive or negative. In the end we get strong, robust results based only on a simple, objective count of the number of articles, which seems to indicate that we have captured relevant information through our measure of media attention.
In Table 1 column 2 to 4, we report sample summary statistic across different media coverage (HITS) groups. Each year we group the IPO firms into HITS tercile. Then, we pool all the years together for each HITS tercile and report sample means for each pooled tercile. Table 1 shows that first day return increases with media coverage, from around 14% for the low coverage group to 26% for the high coverage group. More media coverage is also associated with older firms, firms with larger pre IPO assets, larger offering size, greater upward price revision and more prestigious underwriters. Another observation is that firms with more media coverage also have shorter interval between filing day and issue day. If there is the same amount of news associated with each IPO, when we standardize the number of news into a per month measure, smaller interval will be associated with more HITS. The media coverage over one month window has no such standardization issue.
In Table 2 , we report summary statistic for HITS. It has mean 2.9. Positive price revision is associated with larger HITS, 3.4, while negative price revision is associated with smaller HITS, 2.4. The maximum HITS is 163.9, which is not an integer because of the standardization, and minimum HITS is 0. In all of our analyses from now on, we winsorize the HITS at 99 percentile. All the results are robust if we use the raw HITS instead of the winsorized ones. About 17% of the observations have 0 hits, therefore the median is slightly lower than mean.
Media coverage and underpricing
We interpret media attention as a proxy for the private information reported to the underwriter by investors. Media attention is a good proxy for investor approval because reporters are trying to predict demand for an offering (i.e. interest in that offering, and in the company), just as investors are in part trying to predict how interested other investors will be in the offering. With both investor feedback and media attention, what we have are many signals from many different people, reflecting each person's estimate of demand for the shares 6 . If they expect demand to be high, then investors will want to buy the stock and reporters will want to write about it (and later, analysts will want to cover it). Opinions are all being formed at once, especially during the last couple of weeks before the offering is priced, so there is likely to be a strong correlation between the two sets of opinions, making media attention a good proxy for investor demand.
Moreover, there is likely to be some leakage in both directions. Once a reporter decides to write an article on a company, she generally will get opinions from various investors, and thus the final article will convey the opinions of both the journalist and a few investors. Once the article is published, it may draw the attention of even more investors to the company. Thus, the correlation between media attention and the feedback of investors following the road show will not be perfect, but it should be significantly positive, making media attention a good proxy.
It may seem that price revision alone should be a sufficient proxy for investor demand reported during book building. Based on theory, however, price revisions will not perfectly reflect investor demand, because the underwriter is optimizing across many dimensions when choosing the offer price and investor allocations. The underwriter sets the offer price not only to give a sufficient return to informed investors, but also to try to minimize excess returns to the uninformed given the restrictions of the one price rule, as discussed earlier. Since the informed decide whether to participate and evaluate ex ante, based on expected return, the underwriter can give the same expected return to the informed at a lower total cost to the issuer by loading relatively more of the expected return into the very hot issues, where demand from informed is so high that relatively few shares need to be allocated to uninformed.
Thus, particularly when expected underpricing is high (for example, due to uncertainty), most of the underpricing may be loaded into the very hottest offerings. This skewed allocation approach is efficient as long as informed investors are somewhat diversified and/or are not too risk averse (i.e. don't mind having their expected return concentrated mainly in the really hot offerings).
Also, when the demand for information is high (perhaps because of more uncertainty), more informed investors may be needed, and thus the informed may find themselves 6 And that estimate of future demand is based largely on their forecast of the future success of the company, relative to competitors. There is uncertainty with any forecasting, but the consensus of many relatively well informed investors or reporters is likely to be a fairly good estimate of future value. limited to relatively small allocations. So, underpricing per share has to be higher to give a sufficient total return to each informed investor. In addition, underpricing is concentrated mainly in positive revisions because it's easier to induce truthful revelation that way (the Benveniste and Spindt 1989 truth-telling constraints). Last, required underpricing may be concentrated mainly in positive price revisions, particularly in the very largest upward price revisions, because of issuer preferences. Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that issuers will be less upset about underpricing when the company's issue price is unexpectedly higher for whatever reason (prospect theory).
For all of these reasons, price revisions and the reported information of investors won't be perfectly (certainly not strictly linearly) related. Thus, a second proxy, media attention, may also be useful and have implications. We include price revision as well as media attention in all of our regressions and find that both are significant in explaining underpricing.
Last, media attention helps to overcome a coordination problem among investors and thus may affect the value of the company. Sherman (2005) shows that a key advantage of book building is that the underwriter coordinates the entry of investors. This helps investors get around the problem that they prefer to evaluate stocks that other investors will also become familiar with. Even if an investor identifies an undervalued stock, trying to take advantage of that undervaluation is risky if the stock has no liquidity and has been overlooked by the market. For an illiquid, overlooked stock, buying a stake is likely to drive the price up, and the investor may then have to wait for an unlimited amount of time before the market recognizes the mis-valuation, since others are not monitoring the stock. The underwriter can overcome this coordination problem, reducing the chance that a stock will end up in "the Orphanage" 7 , by giving many investors an incentive to become familiar with the stock during the IPO.
Media attention both helps to overcome this coordination problem and serves as an indicator of whether the problem has been overcome. We argue that media attention is a proxy for the private information reported by investors during the book building process, but it may also tend to influence the opinions, and hence the reported demand, of investors. Media attention before the IPO peaks during the last few weeks before the first trading day, during the same period that the road shows are occurring and the investors are reporting their demand to the underwriter. Thus, each of the two (investor opinion and media coverage) are likely to affect each other and to be jointly determined, making 7 An Orphan stock is one that does not trade actively, has no analyst coverage and has no following among institutional investors. Such a company continues to bear all of the ongoing costs of being public (costs that are even higher since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley) but has few of the benefits -it cannot do a follow-on offering or use its stock as 'currency' for an acquisition, its stock price is not a good benchmark for various stakeholders that want to monitor the health of the company, and corporate insiders cannot exit by selling their shares at a reasonable price. A company that is likely to end up in the Orphanage after going public is generally better off staying private.
it impossible for us to unravel a single path of causality. The only clear fact is that the underwriter, in a book building IPO, can use both in setting the final price.
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If media attention is a good proxy for the private information of investors, then all of the predictions of book building models regarding the relationship between reported investor demand and underpricing will lead to predictions regarding media attention. Book building models originating with Beneveniste and Spindt (1989) predict that underpricing will be concentrated in high demand offerings, in order to make it easier to induce truthful revelation of the investors' private information even when that information will be used to raise the offer price for high demand offerings 9 . We therefore form the following hypothesis: (H1): Information production theories predict that more media coverage relates to greater underpricing when investor demand is relatively high, while the relationship between media coverage and underpricing should be much weaker, if it exists at all, for lowdemand offerings.
In this section, we define demand to be relatively high when the offer price is revised upwards from the midpoint of the initial range and low when the offer price is revised downwards. The logic is that the private information of investors will be reflected into price revisions. Sherman and Titman (2002) show that underpricing may occur even for low-demand offerings in extreme cases, when excessively high levels of underpricing are needed to induce sufficient information collection. Even in those cases, however, underpricing should be substantially greater (and more closely tied to other factors) for high demand offerings.
This brings up the question of whether the underwriter could not, much more cheaply, skip the road shows and the rewards for regular investors, and simply monitor media attention for a few weeks before setting the price. However, this would not get around the coordination problem, convincing each investor that others were likely to pay attention to the offering also. Book building can do this for investors by effectively paying those investors (through underpricing) to show up at the road show and consider the offering. There is not, in the US at least, any legal way to bribe reporters into paying attention to an offering. Thus relying exclusively on media attention when pricing an offering might not generate sufficient information, particularly for riskier, harder to price offerings, and may even lead to a lack of interest from the media. In practice, a big part of the motivation of reporters to cover an IPO firm is the conviction that investors may be attracted, and thus that there will be a demand for coverage of the offering. If the investors are not attracted, then the media have little incentive to pay attention either.
It must also be remembered that ultimately media attention, like analyst coverage, is a means to an end and not an end in itself. What the issuer needs in the end are investors that will buy, hold and follow the stock. Both media attention and analyst coverage are valuable only because they help to attract investors, both through economies of scale in information production and through coordination. 9 It may appear that more media attention should mean a lower cost of information and thus lower underpricing. The problem with this approach is with the idea that high media attention is a signal but that low media attention means that one has not received any information. All IPOs receive a media 'signal': companies that have failed to attract media attention have (ex post) received a 'bad' signal, since their inability to excite journalists means that they are also unlikely to excite investors.
Univariate result
We begin the analysis by showing some univariate results. Each year, we sort firms into five groups based on media coverage (HITS). For each HITS quartile, we pool all the years together and calculate the average first day return. Panel 1 of Figure 1 shows that with average media coverage increasing from 0.3 in the lowest quartile to 18.5 in the highest quartile, the first day return also increases monotonically from slightly above 15% to 25%, an increase of 2/3. We repeat the above practice twice in two sub-samples: the sub-sample with positive price revisions and the one with negative price revisions. Consistent with previous studies, Panels B and C show that positive price revisions are associated with much larger first day returns than negative price revisions. The more interesting result for us is that there is no monotonic relation between initial return and media coverage in the negative revision group. In contrast, there is a strong positive relation between media coverage and underpricing in the positive price revision sub-sample. Table 3 reports the regression results of the effects of media coverage on IPO first day return. We control for other factors through the following explanatory variables: percentage price revision (△P), positive percentage price revision (△PP + ), rank of lead underwriter (RANK), technology firm or internet firm dummy (TECHINT), logarithm of pre IPO asset (log(ASSET)), global issue indicator (GLOBAL), a venture backed indicator (VENT), logarithm of firm age (log(1+AGE)), logarithm of offer size (log(OFFSIZE), retained shares as proportion of total share offering (OVERHANG).
Regression results
We follow Lowry and Schwert (2004) in our market return measure, using the equallyweighted return for 15 trading days prior to the IPO day for a portfolio of either technology or non-technology firms that have had their IPO in the last year, but not in the last month (IPORET). Finally, following Loughran and Ritter (2004), we allow IPO first day returns to be different across four subperiods, 1981-1989, 1990-1998, 1999-2000 and 2001-2004 by adding three time dummies, 90_D, BUBBLE_D and POSTBUBBLE_D.
Since some IPOs are clustered in time, their returns may not be independent of each other, which may cause the standard errors of the coefficients to be under-estimated. We adjust all of the standard errors to address this clustering problem over time. We also adjust them for clustering by industry, since there could be industry patterns in terms of the level of media attention that a particular IPO is likely to attract.
In the first regression, we find IPO underpricing increases significantly with media coverage. In the second regression, we construct a 'good news' variable by interacting the HITS with the price revision dummy, PREV_D. The coefficient for HITS, now capturing the effect of media when demand is low, is not significant. The coefficient for the effect of media attention when demand is strong (1.674+0.317) is significant. The results are consistent with hypothesis 1. If media coverage, like price revision, is a noisy signal of the private information revealed by the informed investors, then it should be related to underpricing in order to compensate investors.
Note that we are not trying to argue that media coverage is a better proxy than price revision, since we believe that price revision is actually a less noisy proxy. Table 3 shows that positive price revision is very significant. From Regression (2) of Table 3 , a 10% higher price update corresponds with a 14.8% (1.342 + 0.139) higher initial return, while a 10% lower price update corresponds with a 1.4% lower initial return. But, as explained earlier, price revision alone will not perfectly reflect all information reported by investors (according to Sherman and Titman, 2002) , leaving room for a second proxy. We interpret our results to be consistent with the argument that media coverage provides additional information, in addition to price revision.
Media coverage is significant not only statistically but also economically. Conditioning on price revision being positive, a one standard deviation increase in HITS leads to 8.14% more underpricing.
10 Another way to think of our results is that one extra piece of media coverage is associated with around two percentage points greater underpricing.
Robustness checks
We also perform a set of robustness tests. In the third regression of Table 3 we delete all of the observations which have zero media coverage to make sure that the results are not solely driven by the firms with no media coverage. In the fourth regression, instead of three sub-period dummies, we include one dummy for each year, to better control the time trend. The results show little change from these controls.
In the fifth regression, we exclude the IPOs completed during the internet bubble period to make sure the results are not solely driven by the internet bubble. The coefficient for HITS*PREV_D decreases in magnitude, but is still statistically significant. Untabulated results show that restricting the sample to the 1980-1989 period yields similar results.
We are already clustering by industry to adjust for possible industry patterns in media coverage of companies, but we add two regressions to try to further adjust for this. In the sixth regression, we adjust for industry fixed effects. In regression 7, we replace our measure of HITS with abnormal HITS, which is our original measure minus the previous 6 month monthly average HITs. In other words, we use (HITS-(hits for past 12 monthshits for past 6 month)/6) as a measure of abnormal HITs. We skip 6 months by using (past 12 month media coverage -past 6 months media coverage) in order to avoid the situation that before filing, there is already information leakage about the issue. These adjustments have little effect on our results.
Finally, in the last regression, we add more control variables, including: days between filing day and the issue day (FDATS), number of IPOs during last month (LAGN), average first day return for all the IPOs completed last month (LAGHOT), NYSE, AMEX and NMS indicators if the IPO stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange or NASDAQ's National Market System. The remaining control variables are additional market return variables, including the equally-weighted market return 15 days prior to the issue day (MKTRET), the equally-weighted industry return 15 days prior to the issue day (INDRET) and the average underpricing for all the firms in the same industry that completed their IPOs between the sample firm's filing day and issue day (HOTIPO). The industry classifications follow the Fama-French 39 industries.
To check for asymmetries, we also include only the positive values for all of the market return measures, including our original market return measure (IPORET+, MKTRET+, INDRET+ and HOTIPO+). The inclusion of all of these extra control variables has little effect on our main results, and most of the added variables are not significant. Industry returns have a positive effect on underpricing that is significant at the 5% level.
We also replicate all the regressions using media coverage during only the last month prior to the issue day as the explanatory variable. None of the results change. These results are omitted to save space.
Alternative interpretations of media coverage
So far, we have established that more media coverage relates to more IPO underpricing, and the relation is asymmetric with respect to price revision directions. Conditioning on positive price revision, more media coverage is associated with greater underpricing. There is no relation between media coverage and underpricing when price revision is negative. We argue that media coverage represents the information generated during the pre-selling period, and that the results are consistent with the information production interpretation of underpricing in Sherman and Titman (2002) . However, there are at least two other interpretations that are potentially consistent with the documented results.
First, Loughran and Ritter (2002) offer an alternate explanation of IPO underpricing based on prospect theory, arguing that "issuers make a distinction between direct costs (spreads) and opportunity costs (money left on the table)" (p. 430) 11 . Underwriters may be able to take advantage of the fact that issuers weigh the opportunity cost of underpricing less heavily than the direct cost of higher fees, by shifting part of their compensation from fees to underpricing. The underwriter then allocates the underpriced shares to favored investors in exchange for some sort of 'kickback', perhaps through higher fees on future services.
Prospect theory can explain underpricing only if the issuer's differential weighting for fees vs. opportunity costs is great enough to outweigh the costs to the underwriter of shifting compensation from fees to underpricing. The main cost of this shift is that there will be some leakage, with the underwriter unable to fully recover all of the benefits of underpricing that are officially given to investors. Explicit 'kickbacks' are illegal, although they have occurred anyway, at least in some cases during the internet bubble (see Loughran and Ritter, 2004 , for more information on these scandals). Nevertheless the legal restrictions, along with the fact that the underpricing is spread across many different investors, only some of whom may be open to risky illegal arrangements or even to a more moderate 'quid pro quo', mean that underwriters will not always be able to recover a sufficient proportion of the benefits given to investors to make underpricing more desirable than higher fees.
However, prospect theory can explain the distribution of initial returns even in cases in which it cannot explain the overall level. In this sense, it can function in the same way as Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) information reporting theory, which generally cannot explain the level of underpricing 12 but still may explain how underpricing will be distributed across offerings. For example, if underpricing is caused by the need to compensate investors for their costs of evaluation (as in Sherman and Titman, 2002) , then Benveniste and Spindt have shown that the underpricing will not be distributed evenly across offerings but will instead be concentrated in hot offerings, where many investors report favorable information, in order to induce investors to report that information accurately.
Similarly, if IPOs have to be underpriced on average to compensate investors for costly evaluation, prospect theory would argue that the underpricing should not be distributed evenly across offerings but should instead be concentrated in the hot offerings, because the issuer does not mind underpricing as much when the offering price is still unexpectedly high. Thus, prospect theory can in some cases explain the overall level of underpricing, and it offers an explanation for the distribution of underpricing even when it cannot explain the level.
Moreover, prospect theory does not distinguish between various types of information, assuming that issuers care only about their final returns. If more media attention leads to a higher market price, for whatever reason, then prospect theory would predict that the offering price would only partially adjust to the public information contained in the level of media attention. The failure of the underwriter to fully incorporate the information contained in the level of media attention achieved may be evidence that issuers' preferences are consistent with prospect theory.
Second, sentiment models such as Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) If there are many investors that are informed, then the underpricing required simply to get those investors to reveal their endowed information will be the marginal value of each investor's information, which is likely to be quite small. Thus, information reporting by itself generally accounts for very little (if any) underpricing. 13 Derrien (2005) also has a sentiment model of IPO underpricing, driven by aftermarket price support. Aftermarket price support is suboptimal for all agents in the model, however, so the model applies only to firm's long run fundamental value, positive initial returns may occur as a result of investors' optimism driving up aftermarket prices. If media coverage during the preselling period relates to investor sentiment, then more media attention could be related to underpricing.
In this section, we investigate what the media coverage really represents and design tests to differentiate between the alternative explanations.
Media coverage and ex-ante uncertainty
If media attention is a good proxy for investor approval/market demand at the time that the IPO is priced, then it will be consistent with various patterns in the data that are predicted based on investor feedback in the road show. Sherman and Titman (2002) predict that 1) expected underpricing is greater when the cost of information is greater; and 2) when expected underpricing is greater, for example because of more uncertainty, we would generally also expect to see more skewed underpricing patterns, with more underpricing concentrated in the especially hot offerings. Media attention and price revision are our proxies for investor demand, and so we would expect to see initial returns higher: when uncertainty is greater; when there is more media attention; or when the price is revised upwards by a larger amount from the midpoint of the initial range. More importantly for this section, we would expect the effects of more uncertainty to magnify the effects of more media attention or a larger price revision, but only for offers with a positive price revision (in other words, the interaction terms should be significant). The prediction is summarized in the following hypothesis.
(H2): The information production hypothesis predicts that the relations between underpricing and either media coverage or price revision is stronger when ex ante uncertainty is greater, but only for offers that experience a positive price revision.
Prospect theory does not have the same predictions, because after controlling for the wealth increase of the managers, there is no role for uncertainty to play. The prediction of the investor sentiment story is unclear since there is no clear relation between investor sentiment and uncertainty.
To measure ex ante uncertainty, we use the proxies used in the previous literature. Ljungqvist's (2004) survey paper summarizes a list of popular proxies of ex ante uncertainty, including: age, measures of size, the industry the firm is from, offer size, use of proceeds, and aftermarket variables such as trading volume and volatility. We use four proxies out of the lists: logarithm of firm age, logarithm of pre-IPO assets, a technology firm or internet firm indicator, and logarithm of offer size. The logarithms of age, total assets and gross proceeds are all negatively related to uncertainty, while the technology firm or internet firm indicator is positively related to uncertainty.
We do not use the "use of proceeds" measure. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that when use of proceeds is "operating expenses", the offering is more likely to be associated with more uncertainty. However, they define "operating expenses" through handcollected data and there is no standard way to characterize the use of proceeds. We do not use aftermarket variables either, because these are ex post measures and it is hard to determine causality. Table 4 reports the regression results with media coverage interacted with proxies of uncertainty. In Panel A, only the media interaction terms are included. As we pointed out in the introduction, however, price revision is a logical and well-established proxy for investor demand in the book building process. Thus, in Panel B we use price revision interaction terms rather than media interaction terms, interacting our measures of uncertainty with the price revision from the midpoint of the initial range, for those offerings that are revised upwards. In Panel C, we include both sets of interaction terms.
In Panel A of Table 4 , the coefficients for all of the interaction terms between media attention and the uncertainty proxies have the predicted sign, and 3 of the 4 are significant at the 1% level. The interaction term that is not significant is for offer size. In Panel B, two of interaction terms are the predicted sign and are significant at the 1% level, one has the expected sign but is insignificant, and the term for offer size does not have the predicted sign and is not significant. In Panel C, with both media and price revision interaction terms, all of the media interaction terms have the predicted sign and are significant at either the 1% or 5% level, while 2 of the 4 price revision terms have the predicted sign and are significant at the 1% level. A third term is insignificant. The last term, for interaction between positive price revision and offer size, is significant at the 10% level but with the wrong sign.
Thus, the overall results are generally consistent with the predictions of the information production theory and with the idea that both media attention and offer price revision are proxies for the information reported to the underwriter by investors. The main exception to this among the interaction term results is for offer size. The offer size interaction with media is only significant with the predicted sign in Panel C, with both media and price revision interactions are included. The offer size interaction with price revision is also significant in this regression, but with the wrong sign.
Offer size is the most questionable of our uncertainty proxies. Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) show that underpricing is strictly decreasing in offer size even when holding uncertainty constant. Ljungqvist (2004) argues that "This clearly makes it (offer size) unsuitable as a proxy for valuation uncertainty."
14 Given the ambiguity of offer size as a proxy for uncertainty, we will focus more on the results using other proxies. For the other proxies, most of the results are significant at the 1% level, and all significant results have the predicted sign.
The results are consistent with the argument that the relation between positive media coverage and underpricing obtains because positive media coverage proxies for the information on firm value generated during the issuing process.
Media coverage and alternative news indicators
Under Loughran and Ritter's prospect theory explanation of IPO underpricing, issuers distinguish between direct and indirect costs but do not distinguish between private and public information. Issuers are happier, and bargain less heavily, when the expected market price for the stock is above the initial forecast, regardless of whether the increase is due to firm-specific information or to general market conditions. Loughran and Ritter show a significant positive relation between underpricing and recent stock market returns and argue that this is evidence in favor of prospect theory and against information reporting theories of underpricing such as Benveniste and Spindt.
In Benveniste and Spindt's information reporting model, the underwriter is trying to induce investors to report a specific private information signal. Since the underwriter can clearly distinguish between private and public information, there is no reason for underpricing in that model to be related to anything other than those private information reports (and, for that matter, no reason for significant amounts of underpricing to exist if there are reasonable numbers of informed, since each investor does not need to be paid more than the marginal value of his or her information).
However, as Lowry and Schwert (2004) point out, "There is nothing in the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argument that requires that informed investors be compensated only for the idiosyncratic part of their information (i.e., the information that is completely uncorrelated with the values of other marketable securities)." In practice, investors are reporting their total, final expected valuation (or, more accurately, their 'bid', which might involve shaving). This total valuation will be based on both private and public information, including forecasts of the future prospects of the company, the industry, the economy and the stock market. The underwriter's goal in a Benveniste and Spindt-type framework may be to concentrate underpricing on offerings in which favorable private information has been revealed, but part of this information may be the amount of market risk of that particular stock (i.e. the stock's beta, which may not be known yet). Hence, underpricing may appear to be related to market variables such as recent stock market returns even under an information reporting model, particularly in a regression using inadequate proxies for the private information being reported.
Moreover, in an information production model such as Sherman and Titman (2002) , the level of underpricing will be driven by investors' cost of evaluation (and the distribution across offerings will be based on Benveniste and Spindt's information reporting restrictions). One of the costs of evaluation is the opportunity cost of that investor's time, which will be based in part on market conditions and the return on alternative investments. Thus, as was pointed out by Sherman (2005) , the level of underpricing may be correlated with current stock market conditions even in an information production model. Loughran and Ritter's prospect theory is therefore not the only model that would predict a relationship between the level of underpricing and current market conditions.
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Testing prospect theory is not the main purpose of this study. Rather, we are more interested in explaining why the offer price only partially adjusts toward positive media coverage. Is it because media coverage reflects public information, which could perhaps best be explained by prospect theory, or because media coverage reflects offeringspecific information about that particular issuer, which would tend to support the information production theory? Perhaps the key here is that, in Sherman and Titman's information acquisition model, compensation to investors will be concentrated in offerings for which positive private information is revealed, because the offering is being designed ultimately to get investors to reveal private information. Such revelation requires greater compensation when the report is positive. This gives us the following: (H3): Sherman and Titman's information production theory predicts that underwriters are pricing IPOs (and allocating shares) to reward investors for producing and revealing firmspecific information about demand for the IPO company's stock, and that those rewards are concentrated mainly in offerings for which positive private information is revealed.
With prospect theory, on the other hand, issuers do not distinguish between private and public information. If we can distinguish in our tests between private and public information, and between positive and negative private information, we may be able to distinguish between the two theories, in terms of which better explains the role of media attention in the underpricing of IPOs. Therefore we will try to rank several potential explanatory variables based on how much private vs. public information they are likely to reflect, which will give us predictions about the interaction between our media variable and these explanatory variables.
Assume that media coverage is a function of information about firm's value, which has three components, a private information component, a public information component and a noise component, V=Pri+Pub+ε. Price revision reflects the combination of private and public signals, while market return reflects only public information. Since P(Pri>0|Pri+Pub>0)>P(Pri>0|Pub>0) as shown in Corollary 1 in Appendix B, the conditional probability that private information is positive when price revision is positive is larger than the conditional probability when market return is positive, that is, P(Pri>0| △P>0)>P(Pri>0|MKTRET>0). Hypothesis 3 therefore predicts that the coefficient of HITS*PREV_D is larger than that of HITS*PMKT_D.
Furthermore, any combination of private and public signals can help predict private news, with predicting power increasing with the private information component. In other words: P(Pri>0| α Pri+(1-α)Pub) increases with α, as shown in Corollary 2 in Appendix B. We then consider four different news signals: price revision (△P), market return (MKTRET), industry return (INDRET) and the same industry firms' contemporaneous underpricing (HOTIPO). It is intuitive that α_{ △ P} > α_{HOTIPO}, and α _{INDRET} > α _{MKTRET}. Then Hypothesis 3 predicts that the coefficients for HITS*PREV_D, HITS*PHOTIPO_D, HITS*PIND_D and HITS*PMKT_D are monotonically decreasing.
Finally, consider a situation in which price revision is positive and the market return is negative. In this situation, the conditional probability that the private signal is positive is the largest among all the situations we discussed so far, as shown in Corollary 3 in Appendix B. The opposite situation, when price is revised downwards but market return is positive, suggests a negative private signal. The spread of coefficients for HITS conditioning on these two situations should be the largest. Table 5 reports the regressions results using different indicators to classify news. The first regression of Table 5 is a duplicate of regression 1 of Table 3 . The second regression uses contemporaneous underpricing of same industry IPO firms as the indicator, and the third regression uses contemporaneous industry return as the indicator, where both indicators are combinations of private and public news. As predicted, these two regressions obtain smaller coefficients for the media interaction variable than the first regression. In the third regression, with industry returns, the HITS variable becomes significant.
The fourth regression uses general market returns as the signal. In this case, the signal variable is not significant, and the HITS variable is significant. The results are consistent with the information production theory, in that the underpricing is not used to compensate the public information component. The public news reflected in media coverage is not associated with underpricing. In the last regression, we use the sub-sample where market movement and price revision are in opposite directions. The coefficient for HITS*EXT_D measures the asymmetric effect between positive private news versus negative private news. As predicted, it is the largest in all the regressions.
Media coverage and offer price revisions
Having examined the relation between media attention and IPO initial returns, the natural next step is to examine its relation with price revisions from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the final IPO price. At the time that the underwriter sets the final offer price for an IPO, the media attention that we measure is fully observable. The underwriter can use this, as well as the reported demand of investors (which is observable by the underwriter at the time, even though it is unobservable to us), to revise the offer price from the initial price range that was set before either media attention or reported investor demand were observed 16 . We are extending the work of Lowry and Schwert (2004), which examined price revisions in detail but did not explore the effects of media attention.
We consider the determinants of offer price revisions in Table 6 , using three different measures of market returns (MKTRET_FI, INDRET_FI and IPORET_FI). These measures are consistent with our earlier market return measures, except that they measure the holding period return from the filing day to the issue day rather than the 15 trading days prior to the IPO day. We also consider the same measures using the returns for the 30 days prior to the filing day (MKTRET_Prior30, INDRET_Prior30 and IPORET_Prior30).
Using any of the three measures of market return, media coverage has significant explanatory power. Including the two media variables (HITS and HITS*PREV_D) doubles the Adjusted R 2 of the regressions. We find that media attention is significantly positively related to the absolute value of price revisions. When the price is revised upwards from the midpoint of the initial range, it is increased more if the offering has received more media attention. Similarly, if the price is revised downwards, the decrease is greater if the offer has attracted more attention from the media.
The relationship between price revision and media attention is asymmetric. From Regression 2 of Table 6 , one extra piece of media coverage generally leads to an additional 2.8% increase (≈ 4.73 -1.92) in the offer price when the price revision is positive, or to a 1.9% greater decrease when the price revision is negative. Our measure of media attention does not distinguish between 'positive' and 'negative' coverage, but it appears that the media are more interested in newsworthy stories, whether those stories are related to an increase or to a decrease in expectations. Those issuers that attract the least attention also tend to be those whose final offer price is adjusted the least, relative to the midpoint of the initial range.
Combining the results from Table 6 with those of Tables 3, 4 and 5, it appears that underwriters fully adjust for media attention when revising the offer price downward but only partially adjust for media attention when revising the price upwards. This is appropriate if, as we argue, media attention is a proxy for the private information reported by investors, and if the underwriter is compensating investors for that private information.
It should be noted that, although we discuss this as if any adjustment is being done by the underwriter, the actual shaving or adjustment for media attention and any other public information may be done by investors when submitting their optimal 'bid'. Bookbuilding can be considered a type of auction in which allocations are based on the bids of investors, but with more flexible pricing and allocation rules than for standard sealed bid auctions. Either investors can incorporate public information, as well as their own opportunity and other costs, into their bids, or the underwriter can design a system in which it incorporates all relevant factors, making it optimal for investors to truthfully bid their actual valuations. Either of these is a possible equilibrium and may lead to roughly the same outcome, particularly in a repeated game in which underwriters need to induce investors to continue to attend road shows and purchase shares.
Regarding the relation between price revision and general market returns, our results are similar to but more extreme than those of Lowry and Schwert. For any of our three measures of market returns -market index, industry or other recent IPO stock returnsthere is essentially no price revision when the market return is positive (coefficients close to zero and not even close to being significant), but there is a statistically and economically significant decrease in the offer price when the market return is negative.
These results are consistent with the idea of deliberate partial adjustment to public information. Underwriters (or perhaps investors) are aware of market shifts and consider them important, as evidenced by the fact that the offer price is significantly decreased in response to a negative market return. However there is no price revision in response to a positive market return, even though a higher market return is positively correlated with a higher aftermarket price for the stock, as evidenced by our earlier return regressions. The coefficient for IPORET is positive and significant for all regressions in Table 3 17 . Underwriters and/or investors thus appear to underadjust for both increases and decreases in market prices.
In unreported regressions, we also examined whether our results are stable over the time periods examined in the important paper by Loughran and Ritter (2004) on why underpricing has changed over time. We ran our price revision and return regressions separately for the periods 1980-89, 1990-98, 1999-2000, and 2001-2004 (where this last period extends one year beyond than that used in Loughran and Ritter). The price revision results were stable over these periods in terms of the media coverage variable. The main pattern for the return regressions was that the media measures were not statistically significant in the 1980s but have been significant since then.
Thus, media was less important in the 1980s, at the same time that Loughran and Ritter showed that underpricing was lower, and media attention was more significant in the 1990s and afterwards, when underpricing levels were also higher. One interpretation of these results is that our first proxy for investor information -price revision -does a better job of capturing most investor information when the average level of underpricing is low. When underpricing is high, Sherman and Titman (2002) show that satisfying all of the binding pricing and allocation constraints is more complicated, and thus that price revision alone should be less able to capture all of the information reported by investors. This would predict that our second proxy -media attention -is more likely to be significant in periods when underpricing is higher, which is consistent with our findings.
Overall, our results regarding offer price revision show that the media attention variables are significant and greatly improve the overall fit of the regressions. The price revision results, along with earlier results on initial returns, indicate that underwriters fully adjust for media attention when revising the offer price downward but only partially adjust for media attention when revising the offer price upwards. This is consistent with the predictions of information production models such as Sherman and Titman (2002) . We also find substantial asymmetry in price revisions in response to market returns.
Media coverage and investor sentiment
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh's (2006) investor sentiment model predicts a positive relation between media coverage and underpricing if the amount of media coverage proxies for investor sentiment. The investor sentiment story argues that the first day closing price may deviate from the firm's long run fundamental value because it is affected by some investors' irrational preferences, which might be influenced by media coverage. IPO firms' long run under-performance is commonly cited as supporting evidence of this story -if the first day closing price is higher than the fundamental value because of sentiment, the price will revert back to the true value over the long run, causing long run under-performance. This story predicts that more media coverage associates with more long run under-performance, because more media coverage reflects investor sentiment, and long run under-performance is a result of investor sentiment. The hypothesis follows: (H4): The Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) investor sentiment hypothesis predicts that more media coverage relates to more long run under-performance.
We measure the long run abnormal return of an IPO firm as the difference between the buy and hold raw return of an IPO firm and the return of a size and book-to-market matched benchmark portfolio. The return data are from the CRSP daily return file. We begin from the second day after issue day and calculate buy and hold return for each IPO firm for four periods: the 7th to the 12th months after IPO, the first year after IPO, the second year after IPO and the third year after IPO. We further construct 25 size and book-to-market portfolios as benchmark. At the end of each December, we group all the available non-issue firms that are traded on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq into 5 size portfolios and 5 book-to-market portfolios independently. Only NYSE firms are used in setting size breaking points. Non-issue firms are defined as firms with their IPOs at least 5 years ago. Therefore, the first 5 years observations after IPOs are excluded from the benchmark sample.
Size, also known as market value of equity, is measured as the end of the year price multiplied by share outstanding and book-to-market is the most recent available book value of equity (Compustat item 60 plus item 74) divided by year end market value of equity. We hold the 25 equal weighted size and book-to-market portfolios for one year and reform the portfolios at the end of each year. At the end of each year, we match each IPO firm with one size and book-to-market portfolio. The matching is repeated each year. For IPO firms, the first year market value of equity is measured as the first available value of market capital. We calculate the first year book-to-market ratio of IPO firms as per-share book value of equity after issuance (from SDC) divided by the first aftermarket closing price. If the book value of equity from SDC is unavailable we use the first year end book-to-market value as the value for the first year. Table 7 panel A reports summary statistics for long run abnormal returns. The 7 th to 12th month, first year, second year and third year buy and hold return for IPO firms are all lower than the returns of the benchmark portfolios. The abnormal return are 8.8%, 8.9%, 14.8% and 13.3% respectively. Some studies (Kothari and Warner (2005) among others) show that measures of long run abnormal returns suffer from certain statistical issues. Establishing the statistical significance of long run abnormal return of IPO firms is not the purpose of our study. We mainly focus on the cross sectional variation of the long run abnormal return. As long as the biases of the long run return measures do not vary in a systematic way with media coverage variable, our cross-sectional tests do not suffer from the above-mentioned statistically problem.
Panel B investigates whether the long run abnormal return relates to positive media coverage. Previous studies show that IPO long-run under-performance is positively related to underwriter's reputation (Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) ) and whether the issue is backed by venture capitalists. We therefore control for lead underwriter rank and a dummy for venture backed issues. We also control through three time period dummies, two measures for the price revision, and total assets. In all four return windows, we fail to find that long run abnormal returns relate to media coverage.
Another possible explanation for the relationship between media coverage and underpricing and yet the lack of a relationship between media coverage and long term performance is as follows: Perhaps more media coverage makes the company worth more, for example through creating more awareness of the company as in Merton (1987) . But if IPO pricing is done mechanically, through comparables or other rules of thumb, then the offer price will not reflect this added value from media attention, leading to greater underpricing. This explanation is consistent with what we have found on long term performance in this section. It is not, however, consistent with our evidence on price revisions, which showed that media coverage is related to the setting of the final offer price, and it does not explain the relation between media coverage and measures of uncertainty.
To conclude, we fail to find supporting evidence for the investor sentiment hypothesis as an explanation for the relation between media coverage and underpricing. We do not claim that our evidence shows that investor sentiment does not exist. Rather, the results in this subsection suggest that the investor sentiment story is not likely to explain why there is a positive relationship between media coverage and underpricing.
Conclusion
In this study, we document that media coverage before an IPO significantly relates to IPO underpricing. The relationship is asymmetrical: media coverage is associated with more underpricing when the offer price is revised upwards from the midpoint of the initial range, while no relation between the two variables exists when the offer price is revised downwards. The relation is both statistically and economically significant, with one extra piece of media attention leading to roughly an extra 2% initial return, conditional on the offer price being revised upwards.
There are three potential explanations for this phenomenon. Sherman and Titman's (2002) information production theory, Loughran and Ritter's (2004) prospect theory and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh's (2006) investor sentiment theory, depending on what the media coverage captures. Our tests results are most consistent with Sherman and Titman's information production theory. We show that the positive relation between media coverage and underpricing is stronger when ex ante uncertainty is greater, as predicted by the information production theory. The relation is stronger for variables that are more closely related to private, company-specific information, as opposed to more general market information. The prospect theory explanation does not distinguish between different types of public versus private information and thus cannot explain this ranking of effects, which is predicted by the information production theory.
Media attention is an important variable when explaining IPO offer price revisions, as well as underpricing. More media coverage is related to a greater price adjustment in either direction, but the adjustment tends to be larger when the offer price is increased, relative to the midpoint of the initial filing range. Media attention variables add substantial explanatory power to price revision regressions, doubling the adjusted R 2 .
Together with our earlier results on underpricing, our results on price revisions imply that underwriters fully adjust for media attention when revising an offer price downwards, but only partially adjust for media attention when revising the offer price upwards. These results are consistent with the predictions of information production models.
Finally, we fail to find any relation between media coverage and IPO firms' long run performance. If media attention's effect on underpricing was due to sentiment investors buying stocks that had received more publicity, we would expect the stock price to eventually revert, leading to a negative relation between media and long term performance. The lack of a relationship between media attention and long term returns is inconsistent with an investor sentiment explanation of the effect of media on underpricing. 
Appendix A. Variable Definitions
where f is a linear increasing function. We also assume that Pri, Pub and ε each follow univariate distributions from (-1, 1) and are independent of each other, and that β is increasing in P(Pri>0), where β is the coefficient of underpricing regressed on HITS. All the following Corollaries are about the case P(Pri>0), which can be translated into the relation of β, given the above assumptions.
Corollary 1: P(pri>0|Pri+Pub>0) > P(Pri>0|Pub>0) = P(Pri>0|Pub<0)
Proof: Since Pri and Pub are independent of each other, P(Pri>0|Pub>0) = P(Pri>0) = 0.5 while P(Pri>0|Pri+Pub>0) > P(Pri>0) = 0.5
The inequality therefore follows. The intuition is very simple. A public signal is independent of private information. Thus, conditioning on a public signal does not help judge whether the private information is positive or not.
Corollary 2: P(Pri>0|α Pri+(1-α ) Pub>0) increases with α
Since both Pri and Pub have the same univariate distribution and are independent of each other, P(α Pri+(1-α)Pub>0) does not depend on the value of α since the distribution of α Pri+(1-α)Pub does not depend on α.
when α ∈ 0,
Taking the derivatives with respect to α for these two cases, we get:
Because both derivatives are positive, the corollary follows.
Corollary 3: P(Pri>0|Pri+Pub>0, Pub<0)>P(Pri>0|Pri+Pub<0, Pub>0)
Proof: Pri + Pub > 0, Pub < 0 → Pri > 0 and Pri + Pub < 0, Pub > 0 → Pri < 0, from which we get our conclusion. [1999] [2000] . Regression 6 adjusts for fixed industry effects. In regression 7, HITS is measured as original HITS subtract to normal HITS, which is (totally media coverage during the past 12 months-total media coverage during the past 6 month)/6. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Z-statistics are adjusted for two-way clustering both at day level and at industry level, where the industry is defined as in Fama-French (1995) . The number of observations and R 2 are reported at the end of each regression. ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Fama-French (1995) . The number of observations and R 2 are reported at the end of each regression. ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We also require the firms to be covered by CRSP and COMPUSTAT in the issuing year. Regressions 1 through 4 use the full sample with available data. Regression 5 focuses on the sub-sample where file price revisions and market returns are of opposite signs, i.e. either (PREV_D=1 and PMKT_D=0) or (PREV_D=0 and PMKT_D=1). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Z-statistics are adjusted for two-ways clustering both at day level and at industry level, where the industry is defined as in Fama-French (1995) . The number of observations and R 2 are reported at the end of each regression. ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We also require the firms to be covered by CRSP and COMPUSTAT in the issuing year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Panel A reports the mean raw returns for IPO companies, the mean raw returns for benchmark portfolios matched to the IPO companies based on size and book-to-market ratio and the mean differences between IPO companies returns and those of the benchmark portfolios. Returns are measured over four windows: the seventh to the twelfth month post IPO, the first year post IPO, the second year post IPO and the third year post IPO. The IPO adjusted returns are significantly different from zero at 1% for all the four windows. Panel B reports the regression results of IPO adjusted returns on media coverage and deal and firm characteristics Zstatistics are adjusted for two-ways clustering both at day level and at industry level, where the industry is defined as in Fama-French (1995) . The number of observations and R 2 are reported at the end of each regression. ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. -18.75 -7 .75 *** -33. 74 -8 .06 *** -50. 48 -8 .68 *** -38. 27 -8 .99 *** HITS*PREV_D -0. 37 -0.94 -0.39 -0.94 -0.07 -0.11 -0.69 -0 
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